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LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.

FRANCE.

M. G. E. ALAUX, one of our most distinguished philosophers, whose zeal and convictions age has not weakened, has undertaken to sum up in a little volume entitled *Dieu et le monde, Essai de philosophie première* his views on metaphysics, which have taken here a very precise and distinct form. In some respects his doctrine would seem to be an expression of the Christian faith, or more precisely the reasoned justification of the fundamental dogma of the Trinity. It is evident, however, that he offers us things new and important, both as to methods of reasoning and as to doctrines and theories proper, touching, for example, the problems of liberty, of evil, and especially of moral sanction, which finds its individual guarantee in the succession of existences.

The work of M. Alaux is concerned with the critique of the contradictory ideas of our reason: the affirmations arise here in some sort from the interplay of contraries. It would be impossible for me to present even a fragment of his doctrine without running the risk of disfiguring it. The devotees of metaphysics will find here much to interest them; while as for myself, I am far from being indifferent to these efforts of the human mind, which is always bent on surmounting the difficulties which it has encountered time out of mind. I can nevertheless not refrain from making one general criticism: my objection is that, penetrating as our dialectic may be, it always leaves it for us to say what our concepts really represent,—what the symbols which enter our system represent. The change of our states of consciousness is the condition of feeling;

the opposition of terms is the condition of logic. But what can be deduced from this two-fold necessity?

I see no way, I wrote recently, of resolving or eliminating these antinomies, which are always present,—the antinomies of the absolute and the relative, of the infinite and the finite, of the one and the many, etc., or in another sphere, pleasure and pain, good and evil, etc.,—save by considering them as simple attitudes of our mind. They correspond to our manner of understanding and feeling; they are the forms of our affective and of our mental life, the states by which we become conscious of our relations with the exterior world. Is it not creating factitious contradictions to relegate outside ourselves these conditions of knowledge and sensibility? I admit, of course, that we cannot either efface from things the mark of our own mind, or subject to doubt the necessary conformity of our organisation with the regular order of things,—a conformity of the reality of which we have the soundest assurance. But it is right here that the true problem lies, and we should be on our guard lest we deceive ourselves regarding the value of the logical artifices by means of which we explain the universe.

M. Alaux will pardon me for the exceptions that I here take; they do not prevent me from holding his work in high esteem, and they are certainly not designed to erect any obstacles to research on the great highways of metaphysical research.

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M. E. MURISIER, in *Les maladies du sentiment religieux*, offers us a study which has both novelty and interest. With a view to reaching a more precise definition of religious sentiment, he proposes to analyse the pathological forms of this sentiment. One of these forms is ecstasy; the other is fanaticism. Ecstasy, the last stage of the mystical tendency, corresponds to a self-introversion of the individual who wishes to enter into direct communication with his God; while, contrariwise, fanaticism means an expansion beyond, with the object of imposing upon others the faith which one has in one's heart. In both cases we have to do with diseased persons who are suffering from organic, affective, and intellectual maladies, and incapable of all and every synthetic effort to adapt

themselves to their environment. They seek relief for their conditions of non-accommodation in contradictory ways: the former annihilate their own tendencies, which they are unsuccessful in coordinating; the latter endeavor to shape the social environment to conform to their personal standard. The ecstatic subject reveals two essential characteristics of normal piety: (1) the need of direction; (2) the imitation of a model. This subjective state, this longing for renunciation in ecstasies, gives us the true meaning of the *Imitation of Jesus Christ*. It informs us concerning the eternal tendencies to which religion answers.

Fanaticism instructs us rather regarding its social rôle. A supernatural power guarantees for the religious man the regularity and permanence of his environment, which naturally changes; it is the tranquillity and happiness of the feeble being which finds itself assured in its old adaptations, and altogether free from the necessity of new adaptations.

Religion, in fine, maintains the social unity and stability: absolute in fanaticism, this unity and this stability remain relative in the normal religious forms. Thus, religion is not expressly either an interior life, as the theorists of individualism would have it, nor a pure manifestation of the collective consciousness, as the sociological school believe. The individual form, M. Murisier thinks, is not derived from the collective form: the internal tendencies to unification rather determine and support the tendency toward social unification, which serves them most actively.

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By the side of the two works last mentioned a place is deserving for the brief and excellent little book of M. HENRI BERR, *Peut-on refaire l'unité morale de la France?*¹ Although this work treats especially of France, its interest is nevertheless more far-reaching inasmuch as the condition of minds in every country is almost the same; I refer to the conflict, whether apparent or real, between science and faith. The special feature about France is the peculiar course which the combatants have adopted, together with a pecu-

¹A. Colin, publisher. The other works are published by F. Alcan.

liar combination of circumstances resulting from a different historical evolution.

M. Berr defines religious faith as "a conception of things which, imposing itself on the mind, is transformed into principles of action, regulates the relations existing between men and between men and the universe." "Faith," he writes again, "is the affirmation more or less conscious of the unity of the being affirming it, the theoretical provisional explanation of that unity, and in conduct the application of that theory."

Can the explanation of Being be rendered more conformable to truth,—can theology be replaced by scientific philosophy? This is tantamount to asking whether or not progress is taking place in human thought. M. Berr does not hesitate to answer in the affirmative. Progress consists, according to him, in overturning the obstacles which separate the subject from the object, in unifying them: and this is monism,—a monism which is neither materialistic nor spiritualistic. The identity of subject and object as an hypothesis is in his eyes a conquest forever; the unity of essence is a permissible conjecture.

Another point gained is that science alone is the organum, the instrument for the resolution of philosophical problems. But how can science lead us to the assimilation of the ego and the non-ego? Here we find again in a condensed form the doctrine set forth some time ago by M. Berr in his work *L'avenir de la science*, to revert to which would in this place take up too much of our time. I shall merely recall that science, according to M. Berr, is the spontaneous application of the ego to the non-ego: our point of support for understanding Being is the ego; in the ego the reality resides, one and unifying. Psychology offers us the type and the means of the union sought. Science finally as synthesis has all the characters of religious faith. It cannot extinguish faith; it tacitly implies and justifies it. It is revelation,—the revelation of the truth; it is faith, belief in the possibility of knowing the truth. Humanity, in sum, has lived upon an hypothesis which has been liberated and proved by science and which is therefore in science as much as it is in religion.

M. E. FOURNIÈRE, in his *Essai sur l'individualisme*, submits to exact scrutiny the established opposition between individualism and socialism, an opposition which he denies exists. In order to resolve this opposition, he shows first that the individual is the result of the social co-operation, which will not be contested, though it also must not be denied that the individual is still the indispensable prime agent. He believes himself justified in concluding, thereupon, that socialism, "co-operation extended to all individuals," is the realisation of individualism. He defines it as a state of things where the state becomes the means of general voluntary co-operation, the regulator of combination, the agent of transformation of monopolies for the benefit of the whole.

But how is the state to be this means? By the hand of whom, by the authority of whom? How can socialism, thus defined, be really a medium to liberty? How can co-operation extended to all be voluntary at the same time? To whom shall this universal co-operation extend? What shall it embrace? What reservations shall it make? These are questions that must be taken up successively, for some laws are not true save within certain limits.

Undoubtedly, M. Fournière has made a skilful plea, full of strength and ardor, and supported by arguments of which the apparent precision does not always hide the subtle and delusive character. The author often yields to immediate preoccupation, the echo of recent struggles in our assemblies. If he is a politician who seeks justly to lift himself to the plane of his theory, he is also a theorist who is disturbed by politics. He gives way to that tendency of the revolutionary spirit which would suppress by violence realities which are unpleasant, which disdains partial solutions, the only ones which are efficacious and durable, and is bent upon accomplishing by a fiat the simultaneous variation of all social phenomena. M. Fournière has too much intelligence not to see certain things which he does not say. He would gain much in force by saying them.

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One may consult with profit the book of M. G. PALANTE, *Précis de sociologie*. Essays of this kind are apt to render good service

in the present state of this science, a state of such incoherence that the sociologists cannot even come to an agreement regarding the definition of the social datum or the thing which is the true subject-matter of psychology; and consequently regarding the method which is best suited to their researches. M. Palante sides with the psychological school. I have indicated several times the reasons which separate me from this school, but I am always curious to learn of new arguments to be advanced in its favor, my only solicitude being to see more clearly into these difficult questions. M. Palante does not convince me, and it does not seem to me that his study will dissipate the misunderstandings which divide writers in this field. The majority, I believe, persist in understanding by sociology something different from psychology, or even from "inter-psychology," to use the latest expression of M. Tarde. The psychological processes are one thing, the sociological products are another; and results realised in time—economical, juridical, political, religious, and other institutions—are with respect to their causes (the psychological agents) specific facts of existence which deserve special study. The history of property, for example, shows us facts which have their significance independent of the particular and personal situations that encompass them.

How are societies formed? How preserved? How do they develop? How do they disintegrate and die?—such, after the introduction, are the four divisions of this volume. Under these titles, the author examines the different factors or laws which have been advanced,—factors and laws relating to race, environment, population, mentality, etc. He performs his task with clearness and attractiveness.

A great admirer of Nietzsche, M. Palante is not, like the latter philosopher, inclined to theories of socialism: he declares emphatically that the inequality of individuals will never disappear, and it is sufficient to recognise this truth to remain proof against all social, pedagogical, and other systems which are based upon what I should term the sophisms of inequality.

The present volume of the *Année sociologique* (1890-1900) embraces in addition to numerous notices of books, which as usual are well classified, three original studies which take up more than 100 pages: one by M. BOUGLÉ, *Remarques sur le régime des castes*; another by M. DURKHEIM, *Deux lois de l'évolution pénale*; and a third by M. CHARMONT, *Les causes d'extinction de la propriété corporative*. I cannot even think of giving here a *résumé* of these three important memoirs, and I shall also restrict myself to mere mention of four studies which make up the contents of the *Année philosophique* for 1900; viz.: (1) an essay by M. V. BROCHARD, *Les mythes dans la philosophie de Platon*; (2) an essay by M. O. HAMELIN, *Sur une des origines de Spinozisme*; (3) an essay by M. L. DAURIAC, *Essai sur les catégories*; and (4) a paper by M. F. PILLON, *La critique de Bayle, critique du spiritualisme cartésien*.

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In the department of history I have to note from the pen of M. ELIE HALÉVY a work in two large volumes, which under the common title of *La formation du radicalisme philosophique* gives us (1) *La jeunesse de Bentham*, and (2) *L'évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815*. A third volume is to appear which shall furnish a picture of Benthamism, or "philosophical radicalism," in the final period of its development, from 1815 to 1832.

M. Halévy has endeavored to exhibit the doctrine of Bentham in its true form; that is to say, as an integral, social, juridical, economical, and constitutional doctrine, having as its foundation the principle of utility, which is itself based upon a certain psychology. First he shows us Bentham as a disciple of Helvetius, Beccaria, and Adam Smith. Then, he endeavors to ascertain how, under the pressure of general causes and the influence of James Mill, Bentham became the theorist of the radical party, and how in his own disciple, Ricardo, the theories of Malthus came to be combined with the ideas of Adam Smith.

One can imagine the interest of a study, supported by copious materials, of so important an epoch, and of a man who has had so great an influence upon the general life of the English people. For, one catches glimpses in this volume of many other features, and of

many other important events; and certainly there have been few periods in history where thought has been so active and so intimately interwoven with the public life.

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We will now go backward more than a century with M. H. JOLY and M. AD. HATZFELD, who have respectively contributed volumes on *Malebranche* and *Pascal*. M. Joly's *Malebranche* is a very readable book, as one might have expected from a writer of his ability. He has given us in his work a study of Malebranche the man and his environment, and of Malebranche the metaphysician, the philosophical theologian, the psychologist, and the moralist. He finds in the doctrine of the illustrious Oratorian a pure type of the constructive philosophy, much more so than even in that of Spinoza. He defends it against the objections which have been levelled against it, as being on the one hand too mechanical and on the other too mystical. He believes, in fine, that if Malebranche could live again in our time he would applaud the progress which our sciences have made, as well as the researches of contemporary physiological psychology; he would see in them the natural sequence of his own thoughts, and would only say that science properly so called does not dispense even now with metaphysics, and that the latter has been unable to destroy religion.

Not less interesting is the *Pascal* of M. Hatzfeld. The volume begins with a psychological biography. The discussion of Pascal's scientific labors has been confided to Lieutenant Perrier, who has every qualification to treat it properly. So attractive is the figure of Pascal, as well by his misfortunes as by his genius, that our curiosity never tires in studying him and penetrating to the depth of his thought.

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M. S. KARPPE, with his *Étude sur les origines et la nature du Zohar, précédée d'une étude sur l'histoire de la Kabbale*, carries us back to the sources of "Jewish mysticism" among the peoples of Egypt and Chaldea. I could not think of giving a complete idea of this learned and fascinating work, which contains not less than 600

pages. It will be received with all the more favor, as works dealing with the philosophy of the Orient are comparatively rare, especially in France; and since we have here a characteristic aspect of Oriental thought, which has percolated through the intellectual soil of the Occident by many different ways.

M. Karppe distinguishes between Jewish mysticism and the Cabala; he does not include in the Cabala all Jewish mysticism. He seeks to avoid confounding, in a word, genuine Jewish mysticism as it appears in its origin and in the first period of its development, with the later mysticism as it was shaped in the post-Talmudic epoch and in the Middle Ages. The Bible, he remarks, is the very opposite of a mystical book; but the Bible is not the adequate expression of the Biblical epoch, and we must also take into account the ideas which were anterior to it. Jewish mysticism, moreover, is quite different from the ordinary mysticism. It does not mean a revolt of faith against reason, but on the contrary a revenge of reason upon faith; the Jewish mind took refuge in mysticism under the constraint of a rigorous monotheism, in order to save its instinct of scientific curiosity. We thus see it extending to all objects of thought and waxing great on the most heterogeneous doctrines, Babylonian folklore, reflexions of Greek philosophy, Christian scholasticism, Arabic scholasticism, the superstitions of the Middle Ages,—yet always with the endeavor of conforming to the Bible, to which the mystics attributed an esoteric meaning. It became the vehicle of free speculation developing alongside of dogmatism and in opposition to it. “Almost invisible in Biblical times, it slumbered in the Talmudic epoch and saw the full light of day in the epoch of the gaonim; it shone with its greatest splendor from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. But it remained always at the margin of the official doctrine which beginning with the Bible extends to the Talmud, from the Talmud to the Saadia, from the Saadia to Maimonides, from Maimonides to Mendelssohn.”

As to the Cabala, of which the origin does not go back beyond Isaac the Blind, it is said to have proceeded directly from the opposition between Aristotelian and Maimonidean rationalism. The Zohar, a sort of bible of the Cabalists, a confused and composite

work, according to the theory of M. Karppe, belongs to a relatively modern epoch.

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A manuscript left by the late M. CHALLEMEL-LACOUR, former president of the Senate, has just been published under the title of *Études et réflexions d'un pessimiste*.¹ M. Challemel-Lacour, who was a philosopher as well as a statesman, has given us in these pages in humorous form his thoughts concerning life and its disillusionments. Melancholy is here sharpened with irony, and paradox gives a zest to truth. Many fine sketches and rapid portraits here pass before our eyes: Leopardi, Shakespeare, Shelley, Byron, Swift, Pascal, Chamfort, and Heinrich Heine! The volume closes with a special study of Schopenhauer, before published in a slightly different form in the *Revue de Deux-Mondes*, but not yet bereft of interest.

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M. JEAN BOURDEAU, in his *L'évolution du socialisme*, gives us a very interesting page of contemporary history,—the history of socialistic doings and ideas in France in their application to politics and legislation, to communal administration, to industry, and to farm labor. M. Bourdeau shows us how greatly socialism has changed in this century and how complex its doctrines are; his study is interesting and instructive.

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It remains to announce the publication of the *Proceedings and Papers of the Fourth International Congress of Psychology*, held at Paris in August, 1900. This publication, of which M. P. JANET, general secretary of the Congress, was the editor, forms an important volume of 800 pages, containing more than 130 communications published in full or in extracts, as well as the discussions to which they gave rise. Good indices conclude the volume and facilitate reference.

I shall finally call attention to the *Revue de psychologie clinique*

¹ Paris: Fasquelle, publisher (Bibl. Charpentier).

et thérapeutique, edited by Drs. P. HARTENBERG and H. AIMÉ.¹ This monthly review, which has already reached its fifth year, is of moderate size but contains good and admirably chosen contributions. Its object is precise, its execution clear. It is proposed to utilise here the data furnished by science of the functions of the brain, for the purpose of treating nervous disorders of all kinds (affections of the spinal cord and psychoses properly so called excluded); in other words, to apply psychology to medicine. The interest of this enterprise for the physician, and no less for the psychologist, may be imagined.

LUCIEN ARRÉAT.

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¹ Paris, 64 rue de Montceau (VIII^e).